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ABSTRACT
This Article addresses a single problem: how can we allow engineers and
scientists from different institutions to collaborate to set the best technical
standards possible, not considering intellectual property (“IP”) rights, and then
establish the royalty rates for each patent owner after the standard is set? The
current system attempting to solve this problem requires patent owner participants
to sign a Reasonable and Non-Discriminatory (“RAND”) commitment. These
RAND commitments require the participants to agree an ante, i.e., before the
standard is actually set, to license whatever patent rights they may ultimately have
in the standard on terms that are reasonable and non-discriminatory. However,
RAND commitments do not elaborate on what it means for a license to be
reasonable and non-discriminatory, or how the reasonableness determination is
different from the non-discriminatory determination. Too often rent seeking patent
owners cannot agree on how to split the royalty payments and end up in court.
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Nastiness ensues. Through the current Georgia Pacific fifteen factor
balancing test for determining whether a licensing agreement (or lack thereof)
satisfies the RAND commitment, court decisions are almost as unpredictable as if
the RAND commitment was not in place. As such, over the past decade, a number
of more predictable methods for courts to use to split royalty profits in RAND
commitments have been suggested. This Article is not concerned with analyzing
which alternative system should replace the current system, however. Using any
of three alternative methods for interpreting RAND commitments discussed in this
Article would be better than the current system. Thus, this Article differs from
others in the literature because it addresses the standards setting problem from a
procedural standpoint. Because RAND commitments do not elaborate as to their
meaning at all, I recommend RAND commitments elaborate by telling courts what
RAND commitments do not mean. By adding a clause strictly rejecting
the Georgia Pacific test in RAND commitments, courts would be free to use any
new test they find fit and would be more inclined to strike down the Georgia
Pacific factors test in the standards setting context.
I. INTRODUCTION
Standards make technology socially feasible. The coat you bought using
one-click technology may not have fit without clothing size standards. The
PowerPoint presentation on your destroyed hard-drive may not have been backed
up without USB standards. And the wallet you lost last month would have had
much more cash in it without credit card standards. Standards simply facilitate the
interconnectivity of components for complex systems
The standard-setting process can be simple. The tale of how the bow and
arrow standard was set provides a great example. A long time ago, it has been told
that a wise Chinese ruler at war noticed that many archers were killed in battle
after their supply of arrows was depleted. The ruler also noticed the plentiful
amount of arrows left over from other fallen soldiers that were not utilized because
each archer made his arrows specific for his own bow. As a result, arrows among
archers were not compatible with any others’ bow. Because this ruler was
supreme, his powers allowed him to mandate a standard whereby all bow and
arrows would be compatible. He summoned his best engineers to determine which
were the best features the army of archers had invented, and to use those features
to establish the bow and arrow standard. Thereafter, and as we know it today, an
arrow can be shot out of any bow. The ruler’s master plan was a success.
Today, however, patents complicate setting standards. Considering that tens,
hundreds, and possibly thousands of potential patents holders participate in the
standards setting process, Standards Setting Organizations (“SSOs”) are needed to
facilitate voluntary standards setting process.
This essay addresses the issue of finding the best method to set standards. A
great deal of literature addresses the standards setting process as two separate
problems. First, economic literature attempts to establish price breakdowns for
patent owners in a standard for the purpose of determining if a certain license

1

Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp. 1116 (1971).
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satisfies a RAND commitment. Second, legal literature analyzes the tradeoffs
between patent rights and antitrust implications from the methods dealing with
standards setting. A gap exists, however, between the economic and legal
literature. Little or no literature has attempted to combine economic pricing
systems with legal concepts for the sole purpose of promoting change. In this
essay, I attempt to alleviate Chief Justice Roberts’ concern that legal scholarship is
2
declining in its influence and that it “isn’t of much help to the bar.” I attempt to
help design a system that compels courts to change the current system. By no
means do my suggestions fill the void between the legal literature and the
economic literature, but my intent is to stem interest for others to do so.
When interpreting whether a patent license satisfies a RAND commitment,
3
courts use a fifteen factor balancing test to determine royalties. This test has its
limitations. One critical problem behind the test is the uncertainty it creates for the
entire standards setting procedure. Other tests to value patents in standards setting
have been proposed, but courts have adopted none. Many of the proposed tests, if
adopted by courts, would remove at least some uncertainty behind the entire
process. In turn, the reduction of uncertainty would facilitate standards to be set
more often without litigation. In this paper, I propose a simple way to compel
courts away from using the Georgia Pacific test. I do not recommend a test for the
court to use, however. Instead, I argue that any of three proposed tests in the
literature would be better than the Georgia Pacific test—at least in terms of
uncertainty. The hope is that by allowing courts to decide which test is best as
applied to the case before them, the result will be better than the current system.
Part I introduces the procedure of standards setting along with the problems
it causes. Part II describes the current law governing RAND commitments, and
ends by piecing a practical rule out of two recent cases. Part III presents what
scholars believe to be the major problems with RAND commitments. This part
then introduces three proposals for determining reasonable royalties and alternative
solutions for RAND commitments. Part IV discusses the inherent problems with
determining a royalty under RAND commitments. It then briefly discusses why
any new system should focus on reducing uncertainty with RAND commitment
enforcement. Finally, Part VI presents two recommendations to help the courts
change the system interpreting royalties under RAND commitments, and make
certain of the difference between the reasonable part and the non–discriminatory
part of RAND commitments.
II. RAND COMMITMENTS UNDER PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW
The standards setting process is broken down into two main steps: (1) the
technology step; and (2) the legal step. In the technology step, the SSO invites all
interested engineers and scientists, i.e., without the lawyers, to put together the best
possible technologies to form a standard. But before the first step, the owners of
potential patents in the standard agree to put off licensing issues until after the

2

Sarah Randag, Do You Ever Read Law Review Articles? Or Write Them?, A.B.A. J. (Feb. 15,
2012, 1:31 PM),
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/do_you_ever_read_law_review_articles_or_write_them/.
3
Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1116.
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standard is formed. This agreement requires patent owners to commit to license
their patent on RAND licensing terms.
Next, in the legal step, patent owners decipher ex post the meaning of the ex
ante RAND commitment. As any “agree now to agree later” commitment goes,
negotiations can breakdown. However, these breakdowns only occur once the
standard is already set, so changing the standard would be extremely costly.
With any unclear legal regime, parties cannot agree on the terms and
litigation results. “It is widely acknowledged that, in fact, there are no generally
agreed tests to determine whether a particular license does or does not satisfy a
4
RAND commitment.” This is because a willingness or commitment to offer a
license on RAND terms and conditions is not an actual license. The RAND
5
commitment is only a mechanism to assist in producing a license in the future. In
a standards setting context, the actual negotiations are generally left to the parties
themselves without SSO interference. “But for the RAND commitments already in
place, courts are stuck with only two choices: interpret the clause in light of its
likely purpose, or strip it of meaning and in that way throw into turmoil the
6
economics that undergird countless important consumer technologies.”
Whatever route courts choose, they can fall short. Again and again, courts
overvalue patents in the RAND context because no one correct interpretation of a
RAND commitment exists. Standard RAND clauses do not elaborate on its
meaning in any understandable way. Not only does the language of a standard
RAND commitment offer little guidance as to its proper interpretation, most
7
RAND commitments do not even give a starting point for its interpretation. The
standard RAND commitment neither references the meaning of “reasonable” in
relation to patent law’s use in the context of “reasonable” royalties, nor does it
suggest if “nondiscriminatory” means that “prices must be the same across the
board, or . . . that some degree of price differentiation is fine but differences keyed
8
to certain distasteful characteristics—discrimination—are verboten.”
Even though courts under achieve in resolving RAND disputes, the purpose
of RAND commitments—to help establish the best standard possible—may still
have been achieved. So to establish the most efficient way to design a standards
setting process, the purpose of RAND commitments cannot be forgotten.
Therefore, this Article makes three basic assumptions that promote this main
purpose.
The first assumption this Article makes is that ex ante negotiation is not an
option because the timing for standards setting cannot be bogged down by
negotiation and litigation. Without the proper ex post information (such as which

4
Daniel G. Swanson & William J. Baumol, Reasonable and Nondiscriminatory (RAND) Royalties,
Standards Selection, and Control of Market Power, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 5 (2005).
5
See Michele K. Herman, Negotiating Standards-Related Patent Licenses: How the Deal is Done,
Part 1, 3 No. 2 LANDSLIDE 31, 35 (2010).
6
Doug Lichtman, Understanding the RAND Commitment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1023, 1032 (2010).
7
See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90 CAL.
L. REV. 1889, 1906 (2002) (surveying the bylaws of forty-three SSOs and finding that the majority
required licensing of standardized intellectual property on RAND terms. “While ‘reasonable and
nondiscriminatory licensing’ thus appears to be the majority rule . . . relatively few SSOs gave much
explanation of what those terms mean . . . .”).
8
See Lichtman, supra note 6, at 1031.
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patents are included in the standard), negotiations are inefficient and lead to
skewed outcomes because determining ex ante which patents should be included in
the pool is not an easy task. Extensive searches for similar patents must be
performed. Each and every claim in each and every patent must be evaluated. The
validity of each patent must be evaluated. The amount each patent contributes to
the pool as compared to next best alternative must be determined. It must be
determined whether every patent is essential to the efficiency and use of the
invention in the pool. The value of each patent must be determined. Then, to
select a standard, all patent holders must negotiate with these considerations in
mind. These negotiations would take an enormous amount of time. As one
scholar puts it, “To work through a process where dozens of companies would
debate the merits and worth of hundreds of patents would take years. Worse, were
consensus not achieved, litigation would run yet more time off the clock, with
9
substantial time lost first at the district court and then on appeal.”
A RAND commitment removes the need for the initial negotiation between
patent holders. The associated up-front costs are thereby minimized. The pool
members can simply agree to make a license of an essential patent available to the
public on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. RAND commitments “allow[]
technological implementation to move forward while the parties in parallel work
10
out legal and financial details.”
“[T]he RAND commitment is, at its heart, a
mechanism by which private parties can delay pricing negotiations without
11
inadvertently skewing the outcome of those negotiations.”
According to one
12
scholar, the goal of RAND is to achieve economically efficient prices. To be
more specific:
Financial arrangements will often be more efficient in the long run if their details
can be negotiated after the negotiating parties more fully understand how the
technology at issue is going to be used and by whom. The RAND commitment
delays pricing negotiations and thereby allows at least some of that information to
13
be included in the ultimate royalty negotiation.

The second assumption this Article makes is that modifying the established
standard because of negotiation breakdowns is not an option ex post. That is, a
patent holder should not be allowed to refuse to license his patent after a standard
has been locked in. This is because the benefits of standardization are clear.
Standards allow firms to produce only one part of a finished product. They align
functionality and common specifications in products allowing multiple firms to
supply competing products. They also boost the economy by spurring investment
in new technology markets because “suppliers can expect the market to expand and
are assured that new products will be met with demand . . . . In turn, consumers
14
benefit through increased choice, enhanced quality, and lower prices.”

9

Lichtman, supra note 6, at 1028.
Id.
11
Id. at 1047.
12
Id. at 1033.
13
Id. at 1029.
14
Jonathan Hillel, Standards x Patents ÷ Antitrust = ∞: The Inadequacy of Antitrust to Address
Patent Ambush, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 017, ¶ 8 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
10

28

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW

Vol. VI:I

Therefore, it is imperative that a mechanism acts as a so-called social planner that
allows engineers to work, without outside legal or financial related interruptions, to
establish the best possible standards.
The third assumption this Article makes is that RAND determinations for
reasonable patent royalties in a standards setting context is complicated. Standing
at the intersection of patent law and antitrust law, the real issue for determining
royalty rates in standards setting is finding the proper balance between incentives
for innovation on the one hand, and diffusion of the fruits of the technology on the
other. Innovators need to be compensated with a surplus that “constitutes a
socially optimal incentive for investment in innovative activity that is properly
15
balanced against the goal of rapid diffusion of technology.” But consumers also
need the best products and to be protected from unreasonably high prices. The
problem here is finding a practical way to consistently determine a price. The
courts have not found a way. With current law surrounding RAND commitments,
no one meaning of reasonable or nondiscriminatory exists; not everyone can agree
if they have separate meanings; and some even question if they mean anything at
all. Considering these three assumptions, we now turn to the two areas of law that
shape the legality of a standards setting process: patent law and antitrust law.
Standards are complicated patent pools. Today, most standards form using a
non-negotiated patent pool by way of a RAND commitment. At the simplest level,
a patent pool is a pre-negotiated license deal on related patents. Patent pools
interest a wide audience. Those looking to grant a license, those looking to receive
a license, and the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) who protect consumers are the
ones especially interested in patent pools. But what exactly is a patent pool, and
how do we know if one exists?
By definition, a patent pool is an aggregation of patent rights (i.e., two or
16
more parties) for the purpose of joint package licensing.
The pool can crosslicense those rights to each other or license them to third parties. Obviously, a
patent pool exists when a group of patent holders says one exists (an explicit
agreement). When there is no explicit agreement, a patent pool can still exist if
17
complementary IP rights are likely to be integrated.
Either way, the three
following components make up a patent pool: (1) aggregated rights, (2) a single
royalty payment by a licensee, and (3) the royalty is allocated among the IP
18
holders.
Licensees, licensors, and the DOJ usually have the same general concern
with patent pools: is the pool enforceable? The concept of patent pool
enforceability is simple; its application not so much. A pool is enforceable if the
resulting competitive benefits are likely to outweigh the risks of competitive
19
harms. While the application of the rule is difficult and very fact specific, some
lessons have been learned overtime.

15

Swanson & Baumol, supra note 4, at 2–3.
See JEANNE CLARK ET AL., U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT POOLS: A
SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF ACCESS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY PATENTS? 4 (2000), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/patentpool.pdf.
17
See Swanson & Baumol, supra note 4, at 5.
18
See id.
19
CLARK ET AL., supra note 16, at 4.
16
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On the one hand, lawful patent pools have a few common attributes. First,
all licensors in the pool must grant non-exclusive rights to the pool meaning that
20
licensors are free to license their IP outside the pool. Second, only patents that
are essential to the pool can be included, and the patents must usually be evaluated
21
by an expert to determine which patents are in fact essential to the pool. Third, a
mechanism must be in place that provides for future review of all patents in the
22
23
pool. Fourth, grant back provisions are limited to essential patents.
On the other hand, it is not too difficult to spot obvious unlawful patent
pools. In general, patent pools are not enforceable when they deal with
monopolization, price-fixing, or an unreasonable restraint on interstate
24
commerce.
Therefore, only complementary patents that are essential to the
25
effective and efficient use of a technology can be included in the pool. Further,
pooling may result in anti-competitive conduct in the following scenarios: (1) if the
excluded patents cannot effectively compete in the relevant market for the good
incorporating the licensed technologies, (2) if the pool participants collectively
possess the market power, or (3) if the limits on participation are not reasonably
26
related to the efficient development and exploitation of the pooled patents.
27
Package licensing patent pools that deal with tying are also illegal. Tying
is the refusal to license one or more patents unless other patents are also accepted,
that is, when a licensor offers two unrelated patents as a take it or leave it package
28
deal. Placing voluntary conditions for licensing one patent on the licensing of
another patent is legal, but coercive or mandatory package licenses that extend the
29
reach of one patent to another are likely illegal.
Even using one patent as a
“lever” for the acceptance of other patents is considered forced acceptance and is
30
illegal tying. Likewise, it is illegal for a license to tie patents with unpatented
31
technical information.
The overall justification is that a patent holder cannot
32
attempt to sell others patent rights that are not actually needed.
Even though these rules are helpful in identifying obvious violations of
antitrust law, determining patent pool enforceability still consists of the subjective
33
task of weighing the competitive benefits against anti-competitive risks.
However, the subjective task can be made more objective by focusing on the most
relevant factors such as the degree of complimentarily of the patents to each other
20

See Intellectual Property Committee, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DESKBOOK FOR THE BUSINESS
LAWYER: A TRANSACTIONS-BASED GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 271 (2009) [hereinafter
Deskbook].
21
See id.
22
See id.
23
See id.
24
See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
25
See Deskbook, supra note 20, at 270-71.
26
See id.
27
See Int’l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
28
See id.
29
See Am. Securit Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 268 F.2d 769, 775 (3d Cir. 1959).
30
See Deskbook, supra note 20, at 266–67.
31
See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974).
32
See Deskbook, supra note 20, at 267.
33
See id. at 267.
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and the ability of the patent owner to license his patent outside the pool.
Nonetheless, patent pools provide some pro-competitive benefits. First,
patent pools reduce transaction costs associated with patent licensing by reducing
35
potentially many licenses to one license.
That is, patent pools combine and
integrate complementary technologies that would require multiple separate
licenses. By combining these multiple licenses into a single pre-negotiated license,
36
patent pools facilitate the exploitation of technology. Next, patent pooling gives
parties greater freedom in using others’ technology by allowing parties to design
37
products covered by patents with many different owners.
Simply said, patent
pooling facilitates the rapid development of new technology by making patented
technology more accessible to others. Finally, patent pools help avoid costly
38
litigation because patent pools alleviate ownership disputes.
However, there are anti-competitive risks associated with patent pools such
as eliminating price competition among substitutes, and discouraging research and
39
The competitive
development (“R&D”) by reducing incentives to innovate.
benefits and anti-competitive risks of patent pools have shaped the law
surrounding patent pools today. The law surrounding patent pools is intertwined
between patent law and anti-trust law. Patent pools cannot be analyzed in one area
without considering the other.
40
Antitrust and intellectual property laws necessarily clash. “[T]he primary
purpose of the antitrust laws to preserve competition can be frustrated, albeit
temporarily, by a holder’s exercise of the patent’s inherent exclusionary power
41
during its term.”
However, the “aims and objectives of patent and antitrust
laws . . . are actually complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging innovation,
42
industry and competition.” So before an understanding of the law surrounding
patent pools can be achieved, it is important to look at how antitrust law and patent
law each apply to patent pools in isolation.
Patent pools face antitrust enforcement by both private plaintiffs and
enforcement authorities under federal and state law. Patent pools in the federal
43
context are generally dealt with under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act.
44
Section 1 governs agreements between two or more parties in a restraint of trade.
Section 1 is the primary antitrust law regulating IP licenses. Section 2 governs
45
issues dealing with monopolization and attempts at monopolization. Section 2 is

34

See id.
See id. at 270.
36
See id.
37
See id.
38
See id.
39
See id. at 271.
40
See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1203 (2d Cir. 1981).
41
Id. at 1203.
42
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 897 F. 2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
43
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2 (2006). However, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has the statutory
authority under Section 5 of the FTC Act, to enjoin a broader array of anti-competitive conduct. 15
U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
44
15 U.S.C. § 1.
45
15 U.S.C. § 2.
35
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the primary antitrust law regulating unilateral conduct by IP owners holding a
dominant position in a relevant market.
In 1995, the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) issued
Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, which even though
are not technically legally binding, provide guidance for interpreting the legality of
46
These guidelines set a flexible approach to enforcement of IP
patent pools.
licensing based on the pro-competitive benefits of licensing by establishing the
three following basic principles: (1) “for the purpose of antitrust analysis, . . .
intellectual property [is regarded] as being essentially comparable to any other
form of property,” (2) “[there is no presumption] that intellectual property creates
market power in the antitrust context,” and (3) “that intellectual property licensing
allows firms to combine complementary factors of production and is generally
47
procompetitive.”
Even though these guidelines do not bind United States courts, courts have
48
followed its direction, and current law generally follows the three principles.
However, the principles in the guidelines are broad, leaving many relevant antitrust
49
questions unanswered. Therefore, the DOJ occasionally provides more guidance
on its enforcement policies. In 2007, for example, the DOJ and FTC released a
report that provides further guidance on the agencies’ competition views for
refusals to license patents, collaborative standards setting, patent pooling, IP
50
licensing, tying and bundling of IP rights.
The DOJ and FTC also occasionally provide specific guidance in real
51
For example, the DOJ informed two major SSO’s—VMEbus
circumstances.
International Trade Association (“VITA”) and The Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers (“IEEE”)—that it did not intend to challenge the SSO’s new
52
policies addressing the potential problem of patent hold-up. Specifically, VITA
proposed to allow disclosure of maximum royalty rates while IEEE proposed to
53
require various member assurances about future licensing terms. Through these
type of policies and some case law applying the policies, the law surrounding
patent pools has been shaped.

46
See U.S. Dep't of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property
(April 1995), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf.
47
See id. at 2.
48
Paul H. Saint-Antoine, Antitrust Law and Intellectual Property: Intersection or Crossroad, 1025
PLI/PAT 737, 741–42 (2010).
49
See id.
50
See U.S. Dep't of Justice & FTC, Antitrust Enforcement and Intellectual Property Rights:
Promoting Innovation and Competition (2007), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/reports/innovation/P040101PromotingInnovationandCompetitionrpt0704.pdf.
51
See Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Robert A. Skitol, Esq., Drinker,
Biddle & Reath, LLP regarding VITA Business Review (Oct. 30, 2006), available at
http://www.drinkerbiddle.com/Templates/media/files/Service%20Pages/Antitrust/
Patent%20Policies.pdf; see also Letter from Thomas O. Barnett, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Michael A.
Lindsay, Esq., Dorsey & Whitney LLP, regarding IEEE Business Review (Apr. 30, 2007), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/busreview/222978.pdf.
52
See id.
53
See id.
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III. THE CURRENT CASE LAW
When the negotiation over RAND terms actually takes place it is important
to know what RAND actually promises. Looking at the name itself, RAND
actually means R & ND. That is, RAND makes two promises about a future
license: that it be (1) reasonable, and (2) non-discriminatory. Therefore, this
section attempts to put some meaning behind those two promises.
A. The R in RAND
“Reasonable” in RAND commitments requires royalty rates in patent pools
54
be defined ex post in relation to ex ante market power. This simple definition of
reasonable is the most controversial area of RAND commitments because of
courts’ unpredictable nature when determining what is reasonable. To resolve
what is reasonable in RAND disputes, some courts balance the Georgia Pacific
55
factors. The Georgia Pacific factors are as follows:
1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.

13.

54

The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent in suit,
proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the
patent in suit.
The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive; or as
restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect to whom the
manufactured product may be sold.
The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent
monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting licenses
under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as,
whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business;
or whether they are inventor and promoter.
The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other products
of the licensee; that existing value of the invention to the licensor as a
generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of such derivative
or convoyed sales.
The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its
commercial success; and its current popularity.
The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or
devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results.
The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial
embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the benefits to
those who have used the invention.
The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and any
evidence probative of the value of that use.
The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the
particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for the use of the
invention or analogous inventions.
The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the invention as
distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process,

See Swanson & Baumol, supra note 4, at 10–11 (“[T]he concept of a ‘reasonable’ royalty for
purposes of RAND licensing must be defined and implemented by reference to ex ante competition, i.e.,
competition in advance of standard selection.”).
55
See Georgia-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee (such as the
infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both
56
had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement . . . .

One court discussed whether the existence of non-infringing IP alternatives
57
should impact the determination of a reasonable royalty.
The Mars court
reasoned:
[E]ven if [the licensee] had shown that it had an acceptable noninfringing
alternative at the time of the hypothetical negotiation, [the licensee] is wrong as a
matter of law to claim that reasonable royalty damages are capped at the cost of
implementing the cheapest available, acceptable, noninfringing alternative. We
have previously considered and rejected such an argument. To the contrary, an
infringer may be liable for damages, including reasonable royalty damages, that
58
exceed the amount that the infringer could have paid to avoid infringement.

Some read the reasoning to suggest that Mars gives significant advantages to
patent holders because a judicially determined reasonable royalty is not limited by
the increased net margin that a producer gains from using a patent holder’s IP over
59
the next best alternative IP.
Further, some read Mars to imply that “the
reasonable royalty assessment should be separate from a damages assessment that
60
calculates the lost profits from infringement.”
However, another court
considered the cost of switching to a non-infringing substitute when calculating
reasonableness, and set it at the loss of the increased net margin the infringer
obtained through the infringing use of the patent holder’s IP over the next best
61
substitute product.
One court stated that the reasonable royalty was usually best measured by an
62
The same court also explained that the
established royalty when available.
benefits to both parties of a license agreement should be considered when
63
determining a reasonable royalty.
B. The ND in RAND
64

ND is arguably more straightforward than R. For tangible products, price
discrimination is defined as selling the same product with the same costs to
customers at different prices, or charging the same prices to customers when costs

56

See id. at 1120.
See Mars, Inc. v. Coin Acceptors, Inc., 527 F.3d 1359, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
58
Id. at 1373 (citations omitted).
59
See, e.g., Hal J. Singer & Kyle Smith, What Does an Economist Have to Say About the
Calculation of Reasonable Royalties?, 14 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 7 (2009).
60
Id. at 20.
61
See, e.g., Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1245 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
62
See id. at 978–79.
63
See id. at 980.
64
See Marc Rysman & Tim Simcoe, A NAASTy Alternative to RAND Pricing Commitments, 11
TELECOMM. POL’Y 1010, 1015-16 (2011).
57
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differ to a material degree.
However, even discriminatory royalties do not
violate antitrust laws unless they adversely affect competition in a relevant
66
market.
Unfortunately, ND in RAND commitments cannot use this traditional
definition because of the differences in cost allocation for patents compared with
tangible products. Patents are the result from high upfront costs associated with
R&D, which tangible products and services do not usually require to the extent
patents do. Moreover, while investing in R&D is risky because a high percentage
of R&D costs are not recovered by the fruits of the research, inventing in tangible
67
products and services does not come with a similar degree of risk. Further,
tangible products and services have much higher marginal costs than licensing
68
patents.
For patent licensing, the marginal costs consist of minor licensing
monitoring costs and patent maintenance fees, which are usually low compared to
the marginal costs of tangible products such as the material and labor to make a
69
product. Therefore, the high marginal cost justifications for price discrimination
in tangible products and services are not present in RAND commitments.
The differences in cost allocation between patent licensing and tangible
products and services (i.e., relatively higher upfront costs and low marginal costs
for patent licensing) justify a different focus for evaluating the ND in RAND
commitments. Specifically, ND in RAND commitments should focus on the
actual terms of the license, as opposed to the cost to the licensor, to prevent patent
owners from offering different licensing terms to “similarly situated” licensees or
70
offering the same licensing terms to “differently situated” licensees.
Two
obvious questions become (1) how are “situations” determined, and (2) how are
“situations” compared? Considering that every situation is inherently different and
that there is no concrete way to directly compare one situation to the next, certain
characteristics should be investigated in most situations, including “the firms’
particular use for the licensed IP (and hence its valuation of that IP), the
company’s size and expected revenues, its position in the relevant marketplace, the
time span for which the patented technology is expected to remain valuable to
licensees (which may be considerably shorter than the statutory term of the patent),
71
and so forth.”
How these characteristics are weighed depends on the relevant market and
72
Again, even though patent holders would be
the licensee’s market position.
practicing price discrimination in the traditional sense when they set royalty rates
according to the above objective observable criteria, ND in RAND commitments
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See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 383–93 (6th ed. 2005).
See La Peyre v. FTC, 366 F.2d 117, 121–22 (5th Cir. 1966).
67
See Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach, 19 J. ECON.
PERSP. 57, 60 (2005).
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See id.
69
See id.
70
See JAY DRATLER, JR. & STEPHEN M. MCJOHN, LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 980–
85 (2011).
71
See Anne Layne-Farrar, Nondiscriminatory Pricing: Is Standard Setting Different?, 6 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 811, 815 (2010).
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See Deskbook, supra note 20, at 13.
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73

do not focus on this type of discrimination. The efficiency associated with this
type of traditional price discrimination in patent pools justifies allowing it.
Overall, the illegality of discriminatory pricing in RAND commitments turns on
whether the imposition of discriminatory royalties will either exclude smaller
competitors from the market or place them at a significant competitive
74
disadvantage due to higher costs.
Whether courts weigh these characteristics correctly depends on how much
information is revealed during negotiations. If enough information is revealed
during negotiations, however, patent holders will be able to capture all surpluses
75
anyway because they will know exactly how much licensee’s are willing to pay.
While patent holder pricing at licensee surplus is exactly the definition of price
discrimination in a traditional case, it is not discrimination under RAND
commitments because discrimination “should be read narrowly to prohibit only
discriminatory licensing to potential downstream rivals and not price
discrimination more generally, else the RAND commitment turn into an inflexible
76
commitment to license at identical terms to all potential licensees.”
Without
reading ND narrowly, a tension is created between revealing licensee information
to determine a ND price and having the licensor use the information obtained to do
77
just the opposite.
C. The Rambus and Qualcomm Cases
Determining what is reasonable and what is non-discriminatory, or both, has
been a difficult task. Then came Rambus and Qualcomm to create even more
78
havoc in the RAND commitment world. However, it is possible to make sense
of both cases by looking at what each case tells us about future RAND
commitments. Rambus tells us that a duty of good faith underlies the standards
79
setting process, that expectations of those members are relevant, that deception

73
See Daniel A. Crane, Patent Pools, RAND Commitments, and the Problematics of Price
Discrimination, 20 (Cardozo Legal Studies, Working Paper No. 232, 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1120071.
74
Scott D. Russell & Hanno F. Kaiser, Analytical Framework for Antitrust Counseling on
Intellectual Property Licensing, in UNDERSTANDING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSE 761, 767
(2010).
75
See Crane, supra note 73, at 26.
76
See id. at 3.
77
See Layne-Farrar, supra note 71 at 829.
There is a subset of cases, however, where potentially valid reasons exist for
concern about discrimination in license fees for intellectual property: those
instances when the owner of the IP uses it as an input in a downstream market
where competitors also require the IP for the same purpose . . . . We suggest that
this possibility is (or should be taken to be) the principal justification for the
RAND nondiscrimination requirement.
Id.
78
See Rambus, Inc. v. FTC, 522 F.3d 456 (D.C. Cir. 2008); see also Broadcom Corp. v.
Qualcomm, Inc., 501 F.3d at 303 (3d. Cir. 2007).
79
See Qualcomm, 501 F.3d at 314; Rambus, Inc., No. 9302, 2006-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 75364,
(F.T.C. Aug. 2, 2006) (holding that “distorting [the SDO’s] technology choices and undermining [SDO]
members’ ability to protect themselves against patent hold-up . . . caused harm to competition”).
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alone is not enough for a Section 2 claim, that higher prices do not equal market
81
exclusion and monopolization, and that deception must have led to adoption of
the patented technology, not just higher royalties. Qualcomm tells us that
deception must lead to the adoption of the patented technology in an SSO before
82
anti-competitive conduct becomes actionable.
Notice the different focus among Rambus and Qualcomm: “Rambus views
the RAND commitment as preventing the exercise of monopoly power that the
standard-owner lawfully holds, whereas Qualcomm focuses more on the economic
equivalence between creating monopoly power in the first instance versus avoiding
83
restraints on its exercise.” Taking Rambus and Qualcomm together, one reading
of the cases suggests that a rule has been formed: “if a patent-holder has engaged
in deceptive conduct ex ante, whether through nondisclosure of its patent rights or
a fraudulent RAND commitment following disclosure, and the SSO would have
chosen a non-proprietary technology but for the deception, then the standard84
owner may be liable under Section 2.”
IV. CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES
Supporters of RAND commitments contend that they are not too uncertain or
85
lacking transparency; critics disagree. Critics maintain that there is “insufficient
86
protection against abusive ex post license demands” because relation-specific
investments are made before a licensee finds out whether her view of reasonable is
87
different from the patentee’s view of reasonable. Had this been known ex ante,

80

Specifically, “the [Rambus] court held that ex ante deceptive conduct towards an SSO that
enables the future standard-owner to avoid making RAND commitments for its ex post licensing to
standard-users does not, in itself, violate the Sherman Act.” Hillel, supra note 14, at ¶ 34; See also J.
Thomas Rosch, The Common Law of Section 2: Is It Still Alive and Well?, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1163, 1173 (2008).
We at the Commission were very mindful of Chicago School scholarship and of
the Supreme Court’s recent jurisprudence in deciding Rambus, and I assume that
the Third Circuit was similarly mindful of it in deciding Qualcomm. But we
were not convinced that deceptive conduct in the context of a standard setting
process could or should be considered presumptively legal, much less legal per
se.
Id.
81
See Hillel, supra note 14, at 47 (“Whereas a monopoly clearly does not exist when a
nonproprietary standard is adopted, the ex post market structure is identical whether RAND
commitments are imposed or not.”).
82
See Qualcomm, 501 F.3d at 314.
We hold that (1) in a consensus-oriented private standard setting environment,
(2) a patent holder’s intentionally false promise to license essential proprietary
technology on FRAND terms, (3) coupled with an SDO’s reliance on that
promise when including the technology in a standard, and (4) the patent holder’s
subsequent breach of that promise, is actionable anticompetitive conduct.
Id.
83
See Hillel, supra note 14, at 31.
84
See id. at 44.
85
See Robert Skitol & Kenneth Vorrasi, Patent Holdup in Standards Development: Life After
Rambus v. FTC, 23 ANTITRUST 26, (2009).
86
See id. at 30.
87
See Herman, supra note 5, at 38.
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critics hold, the deal would not have been made in the first place (or, alternatively,
88
the patentee’s patent might not have been included in the standard). On a similar
note, some critics point out that RAND commitments have no specific limitations
placed on it, and that there is no way to gauge the cumulative amount of royalties
89
to be charged ex ante.
Overall, some critics contend that RAND discourages
standards adoption because of the high risk associated with RAND litigation in
90
general.
Both RAND supporters and critics offer theories to change the RAND
91
While supporters generally attempt to find ways to make RAND
system.
commitments better, critics often attempt to disprove its effectiveness and propose
92
alternatives to RAND. At the same time, a number of scholars propose ways to
93
determine what it means to be a RAND royalty. The rest of this section briefly
discusses proposals for determining what a RAND commitment means, and
proposals for alternatives of RAND commitments.
A. Proposals for Determining RAND Royalties
Economic policy and analysis is at the heart of the three most cited proposals
for determining RAND royalties—The Efficient Component Pricing Rule
(“ECPR”), the Cooperative Game Theory Model (“CGTM”), and Threat Point
Royalty Model (“TPRM”). All methods are used to determine RAND royalties
when multiple patent holders contribute IP to a final product.
Swanson and Baumol offer an analytical tool for analyzing whether an ex
94
ante royalty is reasonable—ECPR.
ECPR sets the royalty rate equal to the
incremental value of the best technology option as compared to the next best
95
alternative.
This rate is said to capture the competition between the available
technologies to be used in a standard because the royalty rate will be smaller when
96
the available alternatives are of similar value. Likewise, the royalty rate is higher
97
when the incremental contribution of the best option is greater. By setting the
royalty in this way, the license fee is linked directly to the price of the IP owner’s
98
final product.
Therefore, IP owners are indifferent whether or not the IP is

88

See id.
See id.
90
See id. at 39. The author argues that “[w]aiting for a court to answer what the parties to a
RAND commitment meant when they used the term ‘reasonable,’ and whether the patentee has abided
by that meaning . . . can be costly and too time consuming to effectively aid standards implementers.”
Id. at 36.
91
See, e.g., Layne-Farrar, supra note 71; Skitol & Vorrasi, supra note 85.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
See Swanson & Baumol, supra note 4, at 57. For summaries of Swanson’s and Baumol’s
auction model, see Singer and Smith, supra note 49; see also Anne Layne-Farrar, A. Jorge Padilla &
Richard Schmalensee, Pricing Patents for Licensing in Standard-Setting Organizations: Making Sense
of FRAND Commitments, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 671, 685–87 (2007).
95
See Swanson & Baumol, supra note 4, at 56.
96
See id.
97
See id.
98
See id. at 32.
89
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99

licensed. Overall, the model considers all economic costs when determining the
reasonable royalty because higher royalties will be given to great innovations,
while smaller royalties will be given to a less great pioneered technology. By
comparing innovations against each other, the model allows the reasonableness of
royalty rates to be measured. With the ECRP, the “nondiscriminatory” component
of the a RAND commitment is usually met because it finds the implicit royalty rate
100
the patent holder charges itself.
CGTM determines reasonable royalties by using game-theoretic models with
101
CGTM allows each actor to receive her marginal
five different scenarios.
contribution to the cooperative group according to four principles: (1) the total
value of the spoils is distributed among all actors and nothing is left over; (2) the
value received by any actor is independent of the ordering of the claim; (3) if an
actor does not contribute anything to any possible collaboration, it receives a
payoff of zero; and (4) payoffs to individual actors will be the same whether two
102
actors are analyzed separately or together as a single actor.
Lemley and Shapiro describe a royalty rate that depends on the “threat
103
TPRM assumes that without a licensing
points” of each party—TPRM.
agreement, expensive litigation is inevitable between the patent holder and the
104
manufacturer.
TPRM determines a benchmark reasonable royalty rate based on
the bargaining skill of the patent holder (measured by the patent holders fraction of
gains from settling the inevitable patent infringement case), the value the patented
innovation confers on the infringer over the next best alternative (measured per
unit of the infringing product), and the strength of the patent (measured by the
105
probability the patent holder will win the inevitable patent infringement suit).
In
the model, the benchmark royalty rate is determined by multiplying the value
assigned to the bargaining skill of the patent holder by the value the patented
106
invention confers on the infringer over the next best alternative.
However,
107
TPRM is only valid in an “ideal” patent system—a system without holdup.
With no indication that courts will use any of these proposed tests to
determine royalties under RAND commitments in the future, alternatives to RAND
commitments have been suggested.
B. Alternatives to RAND Commitments
A debate exists as to whether ex post bilateral negotiations are the best
108
mechanism to arrive at RAND terms and conditions.
Some proposals to change
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See id. at 36.
Id. at 30.
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See Layne-Farrar, supra note 71, at 816.
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See Singer & Smith, supra note 59, at 15.
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See Mark Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991,
1995–96 (2007).
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See id. at 1996.
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See id. at 1997–98.
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See id. at 1999.
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RAND policies focus on patent holdup, such as by encouraging bilateral licensing
109
allowing mandatory royalty-free or minimum-fee
negotiations ex ante,
110
111
licensing, establishing royalty caps on cumulative royalties, holding auctions,
112
mandating ex ante licensing term disclosure, allowing joint negotiations, adding
a term to the agreement endorsing Georgia Pacific factors for what it means to be
113
114
reasonable, and adding a “no injunctive relief” term to RAND assurances.
115
As one scholar
Some propose to allow ex ante bilateral licensing.
explains, it would “simply take the current process of confidential licensor-licensee
negotiations and shift it in time to a point before a standard’s technology path is
frozen, when technological alternatives might still exist and compete with one
116
another.”
Supporters argue that “ex ante bilateral negotiations are a
promising . . . option preventing ex post opportunistic licensing” because they
117
“appear[] a less risky solution to ex post licensing problems.” Others propose
118
adding a term similar to a most-favored nations (“MFN”) clause.
An
international trade law concept, an MFN clause in an IP license allows any
119
potential licensee get the same deal as any other licensee.
That is, if an MFN
clause is included in an IP license, any licensee is entitled to any more favorable
120
terms that other licensees can later negotiate with the licensors.
Even others
121
propose to hold an auction while the standard is being developed.
The theory is
that holding an auction compensates a patent holder only for his contribution to an
122
SSO over what the next best alternative technology could generate.
Ex ante disclosure of licensing terms is a proposal that is gaining a lot of
123
One major SSO now mandates the disclosure of all IP holders’
support.
109
See Anne Layne-Farrar, Gerard Llobet, & A. Jorge Padilla, Preventing Patent Hold Up: An
Economic Assessment of Ex Ante Licensing Negotiations in Standard Setting, 37 AIPLA Q.J. 445,
(2009).
110
Standardization Admin. of The People’s Republic of China, Letter about Seeking Opinions on
the Regulations for the Administration of the Formulation and Revision of Patent-Involving National
Standards (Interim) (Exposure Draft), IP PROSPECTIVE (Nov. 2, 2009)
http://www.ipprospective.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/091118chinastandard_e1.pdf.
111
See Swanson & Baumol, supra note 4, at 57 (explaining that an “auction-like model” solution
should be defined and implemented by reference to ex ante competition).
112
See Robert A. Skitol, Concerted Buying Power: Its Potential for Addressing the Patent Holdup
Problem in Standards Setting, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 727, 729 (2005) (explaining a jointly negotiated
licensing term solution wherein a standards setting organization would “require, or at least affirmatively
encourage, ‘ex ante’ disclosure of intended license terms prior to [agreeing upon a standard], with a
related mechanism for collective negotiation of the license agreement”).
113
See Lichtman, supra note 6, at 1032.
114
See Skitol & Vorrasi, supra note 86, at 30.
115
See Layne-Farrar, supra note 71, at 819.
116
See Layne-Farrar, Llobet & Padilla, supra note 109, at 447.
117
Id. at 475.
118
See, e.g., M. Howard Morse, Cross Licensing and Patent Pools: Legal Framework and
Practical Issues, 3 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST & INTELL. PROP. 42, 48–49 (2002).
119
Id. at 49.
120
Id.
121
Layne-Farrar, Llobet & Padilla, supra note 109, at 457.
122
Id.
123
See Layne-Farrar, Llobet & Padilla, supra note 109, at 446; see, e.g., Ex Ante Disclosures of
Licensing Terms, ETSI, available at http://www.etsi.org/WebSite/AboutETSI/IPRsInETSI/Ex-ante
.aspx (last visited Dec. 12, 2012).
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maximum rates and most restrictive licensing terms.
The policy deploys a
“disclose it or lose it” mandate, stating that any member that fails to disclose either
patents or maximum rates will have to license any patents deemed essential for the
125
standard on a royalty free basis.
Another major SSO adopts a similar policy but
is far less demanding: it merely gives patent–holding members opportunities to
voluntarily disclose their desired licensing terms and conditions with no mandatory
126
disclosure requirement to push members to publish their licensing terms.
Other
SSOs have been experimenting with other changes. For example, VITA recently
required ex ante disclosures of maximum royalties and default license terms, while
127
IEEE has moved toward a voluntary approach to address those same ends.
But
VITA and IEEE are not going to be the only experimenters. The DOJ has invited
128
SSOs to consider using ex ante joint negotiations for actual licensing terms.
“The report emphasizes that a negotiation process of this sort can be
‘procompetitive’ in its protection against holdup outcomes,” but cautions SSOs to
129
consider how to manage the antitrust risks in joint negotiations.
V. ANALYSIS
Signing a RAND commitment is basically saying, “I agree now to agree
later.” But does a RAND commitment really mean “I agree now to let the courts
decide?” Either way this arrangement has inherent problems; there are no specific
130
limitations in place and there is no way to gauge the royalties in advance.
The
arrangement may induce lawsuits and “force[] courts to take a more active role
131
when it comes to pricing patents.”
Even if parties can agree on what
“reasonable” means, this meaning will nevertheless be influenced by what each
132
party expected a court to do if an agreement was not reached.
To make matters
worse, these expectations become more unpredictable “where the value of any one
patent has to be judged in light of hundreds or even thousands of other necessary
133
patent rights.”
One fundamental question is whether it is even possible to pinpoint a royalty
that satisfies RAND. Recall that Lemley and Shapiro describe a royalty rate that
depends on the “threat points” along with the bargaining skill of the patent holder,
which suggests that there is a wide range of economically feasible reasonable
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See Skitol & Vorrasi, supra note 86, at 30.
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See id.
130
See, e.g., Herman, supra note 5.
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See Lichtman, supra note 6, at 1030.
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See id. at 1038. Not only do parties consider the uncertainty with a court assigned royalty,
parties also consider the uncertainty surrounding patents in general. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra
note 104, at 2018–19. In fact, only 1.5% of patents actually being litigated over and 0.1% of patents
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134

In fact, Schankerman
royalties rather than one specific reasonable royalty value.
and Scotchmer show the prevailing legal doctrine for damages (i.e., liability rule)
135
“leads to an indeterminacy in permissible damages.”
Schankerman and
Scotchmer may suggest that as long as courts find a license value range anywhere
on the interval between zero to the additional value the patent confers in producing
136
the final product, it should be considered reasonable.
Even assuming a
reasonable license value can be pinpointed, none of current economic models
appear to give definitive guidance on estimating reasonable royalties, at least in
137
different scenarios.
Nonetheless, while each model has its advantages and
shortcomings, the best “choice of a model depends on the nature of the dispute at
138
hand.”
A second fundamental problem is the possibility that some royalties are
being set to satisfy the ND term while other royalties are being set to satisfy the R
term. Remember, a single royalty must be determined to satisfy both prongs.
Therefore, when a court sets a royalty price to satisfy a RAND commitment, every
license is in one of the two following scenarios: (1) the price is initially set at a
reasonable one, and then that price is checked to see if it is discriminatory, or (2)
the price is initially set at a non-discriminatory one, and then that price is checked
to see if it is reasonable.
While the difference between the ND and the R term is not clear when
negotiating a license, the difference between R and ND is clearer from the courts
ex post point of view. For ND, courts simply look to the rates actually charged to
139
the different licensees. Even though identifying royalty discrimination may not
140
be easy, this is a regular issue courts are already well-equipped to deal with.
Determining what rates are not reasonable, however, is far more complicated,
controversial, and subjective than comparing rates actually charged when assessing
141
discrimination.
Therefore, removing uncertainty in court pricing of patent
licenses may require focusing in on the R term, and less on the ND term.
VI. PROPOSAL AND CONCLUSION
Nothing is inherently wrong with RAND commitments. At its basic level, a
RAND commitment is trying to solve an insolvable problem— getting people to
agree ex post on a commitment made ex ante. Any solution to this problem will be
imperfect. Assuming no substitute for this ex post negotiation exists (i.e., because
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See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 104, at 1995–96.
See, e.g., Mark Schankerman & Suzanne Scotchmer, Damages and Injunctions in Protecting
Intellectual Property, 32 RAND J. ECON. 199, 204 (2001) (The study examined these implications.).
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See, e.g., id. at 209.
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For a critique of the Cooperative Game Theory model, see J. Gregory Sidak, Holdup, Royalty
Stacking, and the Presumption of Injunctive Relief for Patent Infringement: A Reply to Lemley and
Shapiro, 92 MINN. L. REV. 714, 714 (2008). For a critique of the ECRP, see Layne-Farrar, Llobet &
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among IP owners when multiple patents are required to produce a final product. See id.
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Singer & Smith, supra note 59, at 21.
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See Layne-Farrar, supra note 71; see also In re Rambus, 2006 WL 2330117.
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See Layne-Farrar, supra note 71.
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standards setting must not be bogged down by these legal issues), firms choose
RAND commitments because they want to delay pricing negotiations without
inadvertently skewing the outcome of those later deals. Therefore, alternative
proposals to RAND commitments do not seem as practical as finding better ways
to price patent licenses.
The main problem surrounding RAND commitments is the uncertainty of
court awards. Thus, the current test should be replaced by a more predictable test.
Each of the three proposed pricing rules—the Efficient Component Pricing, the
Cooperative Game Theory Model, and the Threat Point Royalty Model—would
reduce the uncertainty as compared to the Georgia Pacific test because parties will
not be influenced by what they expect a court to do if an agreement was not
142
reached.
That is, unlike the current Georgia Pacific test, parties will have some
quantifiable measure for pricing a license. Even if the pricing estimate over prices
the license, or if it is not as fair, precise, or equally predictable in all
circumstances, all three pricing schemes are more predictable than the current test.
Recall the problem with interpreting a RAND commitment starts because RAND
clauses do not elaborate even as to how to start interpreting it, with both R and ND
143
terms.
The problem should end there. If parties had some indication on how
courts interpret what it means for a license to be reasonable and nondiscriminatory,
they would act according to these more precise expectations than on the loose
expectations in the current system. Therefore, I propose a way that may compel
courts to use a model for pricing patent licenses other than the Georgia Pacific
model.
RAND commitments should add two terms. First, the RAND commitment
should strictly reject the Georgia Pacific factors test, which may compel courts to
144
adopt one of the proposed tests.
Second, RAND commitments should clear up
any ambiguities with how nondiscrimination in the agreement should be
interpreted by explicitly stating it should be interpreted as an MFN clause, which
may compel courts to adopt or overrule its use. By adding these two clauses to
RAND commitments, courts may be more inclined to modify how patents are
priced in the standards setting context.
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See id. at 1038. Not only do parties consider the uncertainty with a court assigned royalty,
parties also consider the uncertainty surrounding patents in general. See, e.g., Lemley & Shapiro, supra
note 104, at 2018–19. In fact, only 1.5% of patents actually being litigated over and 0.1% of patents
disputes going to trial. Of those patent disputes that do go to trial, it is estimated that about half are
declared invalid, even many of significant value. See, e.g., id.
143
See Lemley, supra note 7, at 1906 (“While ‘reasonable and nondiscriminatory licensing’ thus
appears to be the majority rule . . . relatively few SSOs gave much explanation of what those terms
mean . . . .”).
144
See Lichtman, supra note 6, at 1032 (“And one can easily imagine a future RAND clause that
reads, say . . . ‘reasonable and nondiscriminatory, by which we mean to endorse patent law’s traditional
Georgia Pacific factors.’”).

